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Livestock  export  is  vital  to  the  Somali  economy.  To  protect  Somali  livestock  exports  from
costly import  bans  used  to control  the  international  spread  of disease,  better  certiﬁcation
of  livestock  health  status  is required.  We  performed  quantitative  risk assessment  and  cost-
effectiveness  analysis  on  different  health  certiﬁcation  protocols  for Somali  livestock  exports
for six transboundary  diseases.
Examining  stock  at regional  markets  alone  without  port  inspection  and  quarantine  was
inexpensive  but  was  ineffective  for  all but contagious  bovine  pleuropneumonia,  conta-
gious  caprine  pleuropneumonia  and  peste  des  petits  ruminants.  While  extended  pre-export
quarantine  improves  detection  of  infections  that  cause  clinical  disease,  if  biosecurity  is  sub-
optimal  quarantine  provides  an  opportunity  for transmission  and  increased  risk.  Clinical
examination,  laboratory  screening  and  vaccination  of  animals  for key  diseases  before  entry
to the  quarantine  station  reduced  the  risk  of  an exported  animal  being  infected.  If vacci-
nation  could  be  reliably  performed  weeks  before  arrival  at  quarantine  its  effect  would  be
greatly enhanced.
The  optimal  certiﬁcation  method  depends  on  the  disease.  Laboratory  diagnostic  testing
was  particularly  important  for detecting  infections  with  limited  clinical  signs  in male  ani-
mals  (only  males  are  exported);  for Rift Valley  fever  (RVF)  the  probability  of detection  was
99% or  0%  with  and  without  testing.Based  on our  ﬁndings  animal  inspection  and  certiﬁcation  at regional  markets  combined
with  quarantine  inspection  and certiﬁcation  would  reduce  the  risk  of exporting  infected
animals  and  enhance  disease  control  at the  regional  level.  This  is especially  so  for key  prior-
ity diseases,  that  is  RVF,  foot-and-mouth  disease  and  Brucellosis.  Increased  data  collection
and  testing  should  be applied  at point  of  production  and  export.∗ Corresponding author at: The Pirbright Institute, Pirbright Laboratory,
sh Road, Pirbright, Surrey GU24 0NF, United Kingdom.
el.: +44 7964499721.
E-mail addresses: theodore.knight-jones@pirbright.ac.uk,
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1. Introduction
The Somalia economy is highly dependent on livestock
export to the Middle East, with over four million live-
stock (mostly sheep and goats) exported in 2010 (FSNAU,
2011). Importing nations have at times blocked this trade
to prevent incursion of exotic pathogens (Davies, 2006;
FEWS-NET, 2010; Abdo-Salem et al., 2011). Approximately
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55% of Somalis are directly dependent upon livestock, with
livestock exports accounting for 40% of the GDP (Knips,
2004; Qeiliye, 2008; Hamud, 2010). Loss of this export rev-
enue due to prior trade bans has been disastrous for the
Somali economy and the resulting reduction in supply has
caused problems for importing countries (Davies, 2006;
Abdo-Salem et al., 2011).
Currently, exported Somali livestock pass through pri-
vately owned quarantine stations, although an unknown
number are exported informally without quarantine
(Abdo-Salem et al., 2011) (Addis workshop, 2010 – see Sec-
tion 2). Before animals gain entry to the quarantine they
receive a pre-quarantine clinical inspection. Upon entry
animals are treated for ectoparasites; diagnostic testing
and vaccination are also carried out. Animals are examined
throughout the quarantine period and rejected if diseased.
The use of diagnostic tests, vaccination and length of quar-
antine vary according to the requirements of different
importing nations. Animals found to be healthy are issued
with a health certiﬁcate, allowing them to go for export to
the speciﬁed country. Whether or not whole batches are
rejected rather than individuals would depend upon the
circumstances.
In some regions of Somalia animals may  be clinically
inspected at regional markets before reaching the quaran-
tine. Healthy animals can then obtain a movement licence,
allowing the animal or the batch to travel to the port.
There are important issues to keep in mind when con-
sidering sanitary controls for livestock export in Somalia.
This livestock trade is of huge economic importance and
with limited alternative economic opportunities it needs
to be safeguarded. Blocking the trade not only increases
poverty amongst the Somali people, but can actually
increase the risk of disease spread through increases in
smuggling and illegal livestock exports. Finally imposing
export protocols that fully comply with OIE standards is
challenging in Somalia.
In this paper we evaluate current export health certi-
ﬁcation methods based on port quarantine inspection and
alternatives using upstream health certiﬁcation at regional
markets; minor variations in length of quarantine and lab-
oratory testing protocols have also been assessed.
Recommendations made on adapted methods of live-
stock export disease control in a developing country like
Somalia are speciﬁc to this compromised situation and,
although they may  relevant to other developing countries,
should not be interpreted as more widely applicable.
2. Materials and methods
In the study a quantitative risk assessment combined
with cost-effectiveness analysis has been used to evaluate
the following different certiﬁcation models:
• Certiﬁcation based on procedures performed at the quar-
antine stations only.
• Certiﬁcation based on procedures performed at the quar-
antine combined with regional market inspection.
• Certiﬁcation based on regional market inspection only.ary Medicine 113 (2014) 469–483
Export without certiﬁcation has also been assessed for
comparison; this could also be seen as the risk with no
control measures as is the case with illegally exported ani-
mals. Length of quarantine period was  21 days unless stated
otherwise.
The species and diseases considered were selected
according to stakeholder’s recommendations. Diseases
included in the study are: foot-and-mouth disease [FMD]
(cattle and sheep/goats), Brucellosis (cattle, sheep/goats
and camels), contagious bovine pleuropneumonia [CBPP]
(cattle), Rift Valley fever [RVF] (sheep/goats), contagious
caprine pleuropneumonia [CCPP] (goats) and peste des
petits ruminants [PPR] (sheep/goats).
For all the diseases and species considered the risk ques-
tion was:
“What is the risk that an animal of species X, exported
from Somalia, is infected with the causative agent of
disease Y?”
Biological pathways were drawn up to describe the
series of events required for an animal to be infected at the
point of export. The estimated proportion of exported ani-
mals that were infected using a given certiﬁcation method
was  compared to the proportion infected with no control
measures in place. This risk difference was multiplied by
the total number of exports from Bossaso and Berbera ports
in Somalia in 2010, i.e. 3 919 218 shoats (sheep and goats),
227 611 cattle and 120 962 camels (FSNAU, 2011). This
provided an estimate of the number of infected animals
prevented from being exported per year by the various cer-
tiﬁcation methods (compared to exporting with no control
measures).
Quantitative data were used to provide values for the
model input parameters; these were obtained from scien-
tiﬁc publications, ofﬁcial reports, recorded data and expert
opinion collected at two  workshops (Addis workshop,
2010; see description below). When a design prevalence
was  required a low value was used reﬂecting the need to
detect even low levels of disease and the expected low
prevalence amongst largely clinically healthy export qual-
ity livestock.
Cost-effectiveness analysis was  preferred to
cost–beneﬁt analysis as the future economic beneﬁts
were too complex and speculative to estimate. The mea-
sure of effectiveness in the cost-effectiveness analysis of
the certiﬁcation methods was taken as the reduction in
the number of exported animals that were infected, any
subsequent beneﬁts are a function of this. Dividing the
cost of each health certiﬁcation method by the reduc-
tion in the number of infected animals being exported
provided a measure of cost-effectiveness, i.e. the cost
($) per infected animal prevented from being exported
(Knight-Jones et al., 2010); the smaller the Figure the
more cost-effective (note: $ refers to US$ throughout the
manuscript).
Cost was  estimated as the price charged. For inspection
performed at a regional market this was $15 per 100 cat-
tle or camels and $5 per 100 shoats inspected; sheep and
goats were treated as a single group (shoats). For quaran-
tine there was some variation and distributions were used.
The total quarantine fee for shoats, including inspection,
e Veterinary Medicine 113 (2014) 469–483 471
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esting, feed and housing, was $5–$8 per animal described
y a Uniform(5,8) distribution and for cattle or camels
uarantine fees were $18–$25 per animal described by a
niform(18,25) distribution. These ﬁgures were obtained
rom experts at the Addis workshop (2010).
Relative cost-effectiveness was estimated as the cost-
ffectiveness for one control scenario divided by the cost-
ffectiveness for the baseline scenario.
Stochastic input parameters were incorporated using
onte Carlo simulation implemented in Excel (Microsoft
orporation) with @Risk (Palisade Corporation), using
0 000 iterations per simulation.
Sensitivity analysis was performed to see how vari-
tion in the input variables affected the results. This
ncluded probabilistic uncertainty analysis, where output
alues for each iteration were regressed onto the variable
nput parameters. Different quarantine lengths and labo-
atory testing protocols were also assessed. Only the most
nformative results of the sensitivity analysis have been
eported.
.1. Brucellosis
The risk pathway for Brucella spp. is shown in Fig. 1. The
odel input parameters for shoats are shown in Appendix
able 1. All exported livestock are male. For the models with
egional market inspection, all animals are assumed to be
nspected. Once infected, animals are assumed to remain
hronically infected and not recover during the quarantine
eriod.
For cattle the proportion of males infected (mi) was  esti-
ated from an old survey of Somali livestock (Wernery
t al., 1979), using a Uniform (0.021, 0.108) distribution.
his reﬂects the prevalence for male bovines found in pas-
oralist herds and at a slaughter house, respectively. For
amels the prevalence was estimated to be between 0.019
nd 0.104 (Abbas and Agab, 2002); other input values were
he same as for shoats.
Clinical examination, performed at the market, port
ntry and quarantine, were all assumed to have the same
hance of detecting infection.
The model equations for the proportion of exports
nfected was the same for all species, as follows:
uarantine procedures only = mi × me  × mll  × mq
uarantine and regional/market procedures
= mi  × me  × me  × mll × mq
egional/market procedures only = mi  × me
o control measures = mi
here mi  is the proportion initially infected, me  is the pro-
ortion of infected not detected at a clinical exam, mll is
he proportion of infected not detected by the laboratory
est and mq  is the proportion not detected by inspection
uring the quarantine period.Fig. 1. Risk pathway for the export of Brucella spp. infected livestock from
Somalia.
2.2. Foot-and-mouth disease
The risk pathway for FMD  is shown in Fig. 2. It dif-
fers from the pathway for Brucellosis as the latter needs
to account for the fact that only males are considered for
export and Brucella spp. risk will be lower in males. In addi-
tion the potential for within quarantine spread is far greater
for FMD. The input parameters for FMD  in shoats and cat-
tle are shown in Appendix Tables 2 and 3, respectively. The
model equations for the proportion infected were the same
for cattle and shoats, as follows:
Quarantine procedures only– at quarantine entry
= mi  × me  × mll
Quarantine and regional/market procedures
– at quarantine entry = mi × me  × me  × mllRegional/market procedures only = mi  × me
No control measures = mi
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Fig. 2. Risk pathway for the export of foot-and-mouth disease virus infected animals from Somalia; also used for Rift Valley fever, peste des petits ruminants,
monia.contagious caprine pleuropneumonia and contagious bovine pleuropneu
For control scenarios involving quarantine, the above for-
mulas only predict the proportion of infected animals that
enter the quarantine. With highly infectious diseases like
FMD  there is a risk of transmission within the quarantine.
Once an estimate of the proportion infected at the start of
the quarantine was obtained an estimate of the propor-
tion that would be infected at the end of quarantine was
computed using a stochastic SIR state transition model. A
quarantine batch size (n) of between 30 000 and 2 00 000
shoats [Uniform(30 000,200 000)] and 1000–10 000 cattle
[Uniform(1000,10 000)] was used based on reported data
(Addis workshop, 2010). The probability of receiving an
effective contact from an infected individual per day (ˇ)
was given as k/(n − 1), where k was the number of effec-
tive contacts made by an individual within a herd per day.
For cattle k = BetaPert(13.7, 21.8, 54.1) (Carpenter et al.,
2004), for shoats this value was divided by four in line with
other studies (Backer et al., 2009). The probability of receiv-
ing one or more effective contacts ((t)) was 1 − (1 − ˇ)I(t),
where I(t) was the number of infected individuals on that
day. The proportion of infected animals that recovered per
day (r) was 1/ds,  where ds is duration of infectiousness.
Infected animals in quarantine are removed if detected, the
proportion of infected animals detected each day was given
as (1 − me) (this assumes all animals are inspected daily for
signs of FMD).
The number of shoats in each state on a particular day
(t) is then deﬁned by the equations:
Susceptible : S(t + 1) = S(t) − (t) · S(t)Infected : I(t + 1) = I(t) + (t) · S(t) − I(t) · r
− ([I(t) − I(t) · r] × (1 − me))
Recovered : R(t + 1) = R(t) + I(t) · r + ([I(t) − I(t) · r]
× (1 − me))
with I(t)·r being the number of animals recovered between
t and t + 1 and [I(t) − I(t)·r] × (1 − me) being the number of
infected animals detected between t and t + 1.
Transmission equations for cattle were identical to
those used for shoats except vaccination was included, see
equations below:
Susceptible : S(t + 1)=S(t) − (t) · S(t)−S(t) · vc · ve · vt(t)
where vt(t) was  equal to 1 on the day of onset of vaccine
immunity and was 0 on all other days. The day of onset of
vaccine immunity was  between 4 and 9 days after vaccina-
tion, with all days within this range equally likely.
Infected : as for shoats.
Recovered : R(t + 1) = R(t) + I(t) · r
+ ([I(t) − I(t) · r]x(1 − me)) + S(t) · vc · ve · vt
with I(t)·r being the number of animals recovered between
t and t + 1 and [I(t) − I(t)·r] × (1 − me) being the number
of infected animals detected between t and t + 1, and
S(t)·vc·ve·vt being those becoming immune due to vacci-
nation between t and t + 1.
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No shoats but all cattle received laboratory tests at quar-
ntine.
.3. Rift Valley fever
The analysis focused on small ruminants as they cause
he greatest public health concern. The same pathway
escribed for FMD  (Fig. 2) was used. Although not consid-
red here, there is a risk of exportation of infected vectors
ssociated with export of livestock from Somalia (Abdo-
alem et al., 2011). The model inputs for RVF are shown in
ppendix Table 4.
RVF is spread via insect vectors (the most important
oute) or by direct contact (particularly via infected foetal
embranes and ﬂuids) (EFSA, 2005). Females are not
resent at the quarantines and insect vectors are not preva-
ent, in addition animals are treated with long acting insect
epellents on arrival (Addis workshop, 2010), so the chance
f transmission during quarantine was considered negligi-
le and not incorporated.
The model equations were as for Brucellosis.
.4. Peste des petits ruminants
The pathway described for FMD  was used for PPR
Fig. 2). The model input parameters for PPR are shown in
ppendix Table 5. Quarantine acquired infection is incor-
orated as a single time step (as opposed to the daily time
teps required for FMD) as was detection during the quar-
ntine. Recovery from infection was not considered due to
rolonged shedding (Ezeibe et al., 2008).
The model equations for the proportion of exports
nfected were as follows:
uarantine procedures only– at quarantine entry (QR)
= mi  × me  × mll
uarantine procedures only– after quarantine
= [QR + (1 − QR) × qii] × mq
here qii is the proportion of animals not infected at quar-
ntine entry that become infected during the quarantine
eriod.
uarantine and regional/market procedures
– at quarantine entry (QRm) = mi  × me  × me × mll
uarantine and regional/market procedures
– after quarantine = [QRm + (1 − QRm) × qii] × mq
egional/market procedures only = mi  × me
o control measures applied = mi
nimals that die of the infection are included in those
etected by clinical exam..5. Contagious caprine pleuro-pneumonia
The pathway described for FMD  was used for CCPP
Fig. 2). The input parameters for CCPP are shown inary Medicine 113 (2014) 469–483 473
Appendix Table 6. As the primary host only goats were con-
sidered. In 2010 a total of 1 098 085 goats were exported
(FSNAU, 2011). Although CCPP can occur in sheep they play
an unclear and lesser role in disease transmission and have
not been included.
The model equations for the proportion of exports
infected were as follows:
Quarantine procedures only– at quarantine entry (QR)
= mi  × me  × mll
Quarantine and regional/market procedures
– at quarantine entry (QRm) = mi  × me  × me  × mll
Regional/market procedures only = mi  × me
No control measures applied = mi
The above two  equations describe the proportion infected
at entry to the quarantine. This was  used as an input
for an SIR state transition model to estimate the propor-
tion infected after quarantine. With infectious diseases like
CCPP there is a risk of transmission within the quarantine
but recovery does not occur before exportation. Batch sizes
(n) were as for FMD. Due to lack of data, the effective con-
tact rate (ECR) was  modelled as BetaPert(0.07, 0.126, 0.127)
from a modelling study looking at CBPP (Mariner et al.,
2006a,b). The proportion of susceptible infected per day
(t) was then ECR·I(t)/n(t), where I is the number of infected
animals. This is in line with the formulae used in the study
from which the data were taken.
The number of animals in each state on a particular day
(t) is then deﬁned by the equations:
Susceptible : S(t + 1) = S(t) − (t) · S(t)
Infected : I(t + 1) = I(t) + (t) · S(t)
To adjust for the removal of detected initially infected ani-
mals during quarantine, the following equation was used:
I(final) = I(21) − [I(0) · mq]
Removed : R(final) = I(0) · mq
where the ﬁnal number infected [I(ﬁnal)] is derived from
the number infected at the end of quarantine [day 21
(I(21)], less those infected at the start of quarantine [I(21)],
that were detected. The “Removed/detected” animals were
dealt with in this way as new infections acquired during the
quarantine would not be detected due to the long incuba-
tion period, however, animals already infected would be
assessed throughout.
Quarantine was assessed with (1) no entry laboratory
test and (2) with all animals tested at entry.
2.6. Contagious bovine pleuro-pneumoniaThe pathway described for FMD  was  used for CBPP
(Fig. 2). Formulae were as for CCPP, except using the
quarantine batch size for cattle (n) of between 1000 and
e Veterin474 T.J.D. Knight-Jones et al. / Preventiv
10 000 (Uniform(1000,10 000)). The input parameters for
the model are shown in Appendix Table 7.
2.7. Addis workshop
In order to obtain speciﬁc data and a clear understand-
ing of livestock export in Somalia two workshops were
held (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, September and October 2010).
The 18 participants came from Somaliland, Puntland and
Southern and Central Somalia, and consisted of ofﬁcials
from the veterinary services, private veterinarians and staff
from quarantine stations. Together they had signiﬁcant
experience of the different aspects of the trade, including
market and port quarantine procedures.
Market chains were drawn up describing the produc-
tion and export of livestock through Somalia. Participants
were asked to provide uncertain estimates to quantify var-
ious aspects of livestock trade including information about
diseases and their detection. Parameter estimates obtained
from expert opinion at these workshops are referenced
“(Addis workshop, 2010)”. Final distributions for param-
eter estimates were obtained by discussion and consensus
using the six participants most involved in the practicalities
of health certiﬁcation in the different regions.
3. Results
3.1. Brucellosis
Market inspection was an ineffective way of detecting
infection with Brucella spp. (Table 1); quarantine inspec-
tion with laboratory testing, although expensive, reduced
the risk of exporting infected stock to a low level (90%
range for infection risk at point of export = 0–4% approx.).
If a high proportion of animals show clinical signs market
inspection becomes more cost-effective compared to quar-
antine certiﬁcation (standardised regression coefﬁcient of
0.8 for relative cost-effectiveness for cattle). Uncertainty
over the performance of the rose-bengal diagnostic test
contributed to a lesser extent to uncertainty in relative
cost-effectiveness; higher test sensitivity improved the
cost-effectiveness of quarantine control.
3.2. FMD
Findings were similar for FMD  (Table 2) where although
certiﬁcation with port quarantine procedures, including
laboratory testing for cattle, costed approximately 20 times
more per case detected (approximately $2000–$6000 per
case detected), almost all cases were prevented from being
exported, largely due to allowing sufﬁcient time in quar-
antine for any infected animals to recover or be detected.
With market inspection alone few cases were detected par-
ticularly for shoats which show limited clinical signs for
FMD (most likely 0 cases detected, 90% range 0–8000 cases
detected).
The potential for quarantine transmission was  appar-
ent. The model predicted that FMD  outbreaks will occur
in the quarantine and die out after 2–3 weeks of quar-
antine. This model assumes that all animals arrive at
the quarantine at the same time; a continual supply ofary Medicine 113 (2014) 469–483
new susceptible animals would prevent the outbreak
from burning out. Marginally reducing the number of
animals infected at the start of quarantine through prior
regional/market inspection has little to no impact on
within quarantine FMD  transmission. This is because any
remaining infected animals rapidly infect other animals
in the quarantine overwhelming any small risk reduction
from prior market inspection. The pattern was  similar for
cattle and shoats. For cattle, without market inspection,
quarantine outbreaks peaked at 49% infected at day 3 and
fell to 19% at day 6 before burning out (results were similar
for quarantine with market inspection).
The proportion of infected animals that showed clini-
cal signs strongly inﬂuenced the risk of FMD  in exported
cattle (standardised regression coefﬁcient of −0.9 for mar-
ket inspection only). The uncertainty over the proportion of
animals immune through prior infection at point of quaran-
tine entry contributed to the uncertainty in risk estimates
(standardised regression coefﬁcient of 0.4). The timings of
clinical disease and periods of viral shedding were also
important with longer periods of infectiousness associated
with greater risk when quarantine was used (standard-
ised regression coefﬁcient of 0.4 for shoats); when market
inspection only was performed long infections (relating to
longer periods of clinical disease) were associated with
greater chance of detecting infected goats (standardised
regression coefﬁcient of −0.9 for market inspection only).
This parameter was  less uncertain for cattle and less inﬂu-
ential.
3.3. RVF
Results for RVF are shown in Table 3. Combining mar-
ket and quarantine had little effect on cost-effectiveness
compared to quarantine inspection alone (relative cost-
effectiveness = 0.99) as clinical examination did not detect
RVF in males. The variation in the effect of quarantine on
RVF risk was  almost entirely due to the variation in the pro-
portion that was laboratory tested with between zero and
almost all 39 000 infected animals detected if no or all ani-
mals were tested, respectively. Some importing countries
do not require RVF testing or only test a fraction of animals.
3.4. PPR
Results for PPR are shown in Table 4. If a combination
of market inspection, port inspection and port labora-
tory testing is used with immediate shipment instead of
observing a quarantine period, the risk of PPR virus infec-
tion is close to zero (90% range of 0–0.9%), resulting in
39 053 [most likely value] (90% range of 5854–38 955)
infected shoats prevented from going for export. With
normal 21 day quarantine length, within batch transmis-
sion could lead to increased risk of exporting infected
animals, possible in large numbers, resulting in negative
cost-effectiveness (i.e. compared to no control, for every
additional infected shoat exported, on average $16 was
spent on control). The inputs with the greatest effect on
PPR risk for combined quarantine and market inspection
were the proportion of infected that show clinical signs
(cs) (standardised regression coefﬁcient of −0.7), then the
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Table  1
Risk and cost-effectiveness for Brucella spp. infection in Somali livestock at point of export under different control scenarios. The most likely value is given
with  the 90% range in brackets (within which we  believe the actual value is likely to lie).
Species Scenario Risk (%) Relative risk Reduction in No. of
infected animals
exported compared
to no control
Cost-effectiveness
($ per animal
detected)
Relative
cost-effectiveness
Shoat
Quarantine only 0
(0–4.7)
0
(0–0.6)
93 313
(61 993–444 143)
66.4
(52.9–405.2)
6
(0.7–15.4)
Quarantine and
market inspection
0
(0–4.5)
0
(0–0.5)
142 793
(62 968–445 650)
78.8
(53.1–396.5)
5.7
(0.7–14.8)
Market inspection
only
7.2
(2.1–12.4)
Baseline group 1512
(889–31 228)
7.7
(6.3–220.2)
Baseline group
No  control 5
(2.2–13)
1
(1–1.1)
(Expected 278 500
infected with no
control)
–  –
Cattle
Quarantine only 0
(0–4.2)
0
(0–0.6)
9347
(5845–21 417)
275
(223–843)
5.9
(0.8–17.6)
Quarantine and
market inspection
0
(0–4)
0
(0–0.5)
9843
(6027–21 433)
276
(224–816)
9.7
(0.7–16.9)
Market inspection
only
5.5
(3.9–9.7)
Baseline group 320
(64–1518)
31.3
(22.5–534.3)
Baseline group
No  control 7.6
(4–10.2)
1
(1–1.1)
(Expected 16 160
infected with no
control)
–  –
Camel
Quarantine only 0
(0–3.9)
0
(0–0.6)
4297
(2019–10 987)
312.1
(232.7–1306)
9.6
(0.8–17.5)
Quarantine and
market inspection
0
(0–3.8)
0
(0–0.5)
3023
(2071–11 001)
327
(234–1285.5)
9.6
(0.8–16.8)
Market inspection
only
5.6
(2.2–9.6)
Baseline group 127
(26–778)
28.5
(23.3–708.9)
Baseline group
No  control 4.9
(2.3–10)
1
(1–1.1)
(Expected 7439
infected with no
control)
–  –
Table 2
Risk and cost-effectiveness for foot-and-mouth disease in Somali livestock at point of export under different control scenarios. The most likely value is
given with the 90% range in brackets (within which we believe the actual value is likely to lie). Median is also shown for reduction in number infected as
the  distributions are extremely skewed.
Species Scenario Risk (%) Relative risk Reduction in No. of
infected animals
exported compared
to no control
Cost-effectiveness
($ per animal
detected)
Relative
cost-effectiveness
Shoats
Quarantine only 0
(0–0.1)
0
(0–0.1)
39 192
(35 301–39 192)
Median = 38 853
620
(520–764)
16
(1.9–27.7)
Quarantine and
market inspection
0
(0–0.11)
0
(0–0.12)
39 192
(34 960–39 192)
Median = 38 837
733
(526–769)
17
(1.8–28.3)
Market inspection
only
1
(0.8–1)
Baseline group 0
(0–8000)
Median = 3891
33
(24–346)
Baseline group
No  control 1% design
prevalence
1
(1–1.3)
(39 192 infected
with no control)
– –
Cattle
Quarantine only 0.03
(0.03–0.7)
0.04
(0.04–0.7)
2205
(719–2207)
Median = 1908
2508
(1995–5948)
11
(1.4–27)
Quarantine and
market inspection
0.02
(0.03–0.7)
0.04
(0.04–0.7)
2226
(718–2207)
Median = 1907
2526
(2011–5992)
11
(1.4–27)
Market inspection
only
0.99
(0.8–0.99)
Baseline group 57
(14–390)
Median = 137
131
(88–2493)
Baseline group
No  control 1% design
prevalence
1
(1–1.2)
(2276 infected
with no control)
– –
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Table  3
Risk and cost-effectiveness for Rift Valley fever in Somali shoats at point of export under different control scenarios. The most likely value is given with the
90%  range in brackets (within which we believe the actual value is likely to lie).
Scenario Risk (%) Relative risk Reduction in No. of
infected animals
exported compared
to no control
Cost-effectiveness
($ per animal
detected)
Relative
cost-effectiveness
Quarantine only 1
(0.001–1)a
1
(0.001–1)a
0
(0–39 134)a
614
(529–14 536)a
0.99
(0.99–0.99)
Quarantine and market inspection 1
(0.001–1)a
1
(0.001–1)a
0
(0–39 134)a
619
(533–14 636)a
Baseline group
Market inspection only 1
(1–1)
Baseline group 0 NA  as zero effect NA as zero effectNo  control 1% design
prevalence
1 
a Highly bimodal resulting from if lab test was  conducted or not.
proportion of naïve that become infected during the quar-
antine (qi) (standardised regression coefﬁcient of 0.58).
3.5. CCPP–CBPP
The threat of increased risk through within quarantine
transmission also existed for CCPP and CBPP. With no labo-
ratory testing within quarantine transmission could cause
the proportion infected to double (CCPP) or triple (CBPP)
(Table 5). For CCPP if the laboratory test was performed
on all shoats in combination with market inspection and
quarantine the percentage infected at export would be
0.2 (90% range of 0.1–0.6), resulting in 15 384 (90% range
of 11 988–18 235) infected animals prevented from going
for export (the lowest risk of all options). Uncertainty
over the proportion of infected goats showing clinical
CCPP explained much of the uncertainty in the output risk
(standardised regression coefﬁcient of −0.88 for market
inspection only); this was less so when quarantine was
used where variation in within quarantine contact rates
had an appreciable effect (standardised regression coefﬁ-
cient of 0.5 for quarantine only).
For CBPP, if the laboratory test was performed on all cat-
tle in combination with market inspection and quarantine
the percentage infected at export would be 1.1% (90% range
of 0.7–1.5%), resulting in 5357 (90% range of 4270–6172)
infected prevented from going for export. Again this
was probably the lowest risk option, although market
Table 4
Risk and cost-effectiveness for peste des petits ruminants in Somali shoats at po
given  with the 90% range in brackets (within which we believe the actual value is
Scenario Risk (%) Relative risk 
Quarantine only 7
(4–48)
26
(10–61)
Quarantine and market inspection 6
(4–48)
59
(10–61)
Market inspection only 0.6
(0.2–0.95)
Baseline group 
No  control 1 1
(1–5)
Note: Negative values imply greater risk than with no control measures.(39 192 infected
with no control)
– –
inspection only also detected about 5000 infected animals
for a fraction of the cost. If quarantine procedures were not
applied variation in sensitivity of market inspection caused
almost all the variation in CBPP risk. The degree of contact
between animals determined much of the variation in risk
when quarantine was  used (standardised regression coef-
ﬁcient of 0.9, for quarantine without market inspection).
3.6. Cost-effectiveness analysis
Compared to quarantine procedures, market inspec-
tion alone is 5–10 times more cost-effective for Brucella
spp. control, more than ten times more cost-effective for
FMD  in cattle and 16–17 times for FMD  in shoats. That
said, market inspection alone is not particularly effective
at detecting infection with Brucella spp. or FMD  virus, but
it is relatively cheap. Market inspection is not expected to
detect RVF cases, however, cost-effectiveness of quaran-
tine with or without market inspection are similar ($619
versus $614 per infected export animal prevented, respec-
tively) due to the relatively low cost of market inspection.
For PPR quarantine had the potential to increase export
infection risk giving negative cost-effectiveness estimates.
Market inspection was highly cost-effective for PPR (most-
likely $6 per infected animal prevented [90% range of
$6–$117]) with moderate detection sensitivity (60%). Mar-
ket inspection was also most effective and cost-effective
for CCPP and CBPP costing on average $4 and $6 per case
int of export under different control scenarios. The most likely value is
 likely to lie).
Reduction in No. of
infected animals
exported compared
to no control
Cost-effectiveness
($ per animal
detected)
Relative
cost-effectiveness
−231 777
(−1 841 505 to
−120 315)
−16
(−200 to −13)
−0.05
(−29 to 0)
−230 515
(−1 844 445 to
−118 146)
−21
(−204 to −13)
−0.05
(−29 to 0)
15 463
(1665–31 592)
6
(6–117)
Baseline group
(39 192 infected
with no control)
– –
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Table  5
Risk and cost-effectiveness for contagious caprine pleuropneumonia and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia in Somali goats at point of export under
different control scenarios (without laboratory testing). The most likely value is given with the 90% range in brackets (within which we  believe the actual
value  is likely to lie).
Species Scenario Risk (%) Relative risk Reduction in No. of
infected animals
exported compared
to no control
Cost-effectiveness
($ per animal
detected)
Relative
cost-effectiveness
CCPP
Quarantine only 3
(2–5)
10
(6 –11)
−20 490
(−40 001 to −3558)
−213
(−1423 to −159)
−51
(−405 to −37)
Quarantine and
market inspection
0.6
(0.3–2)
2
(1–3)
9384
(−220 to 15 366)
561
(−1764 to 3642)
152
(−393 to 862)
Market inspection
only
0.4
(0.2–0.5)
Baseline group 13 051
(12 064–16 631)
3.7
(3.5–4.4)
Baseline group
No  control 1.69 3
(3–7)
(18 558 infected
with no control)
– –
CBPP
Quarantine only 9
(7–11)
10
(6–10)
−14 606
(−18 471 to −7353)
−306
(−676 to −252)
−54
(−105 to −37)
Quarantine and
market inspection
3
(2–4)
3
(2–3.6)
934
(−2148 to 2894)
1600
(−22 796 to 22 926)
275
(−3418 to 3535)
Market inspection
only
1
(0.95–1.2)
Baseline group 4968
(4907–5569)
6.2
(6.2–6.9)
Baseline group
No  control 3.38 3 (7687 infected
w
– –
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ote: Negative values imply greater risk than with no control measures.
revented, respectively. This compares to $561 and $1600
or CCPP and CBPP, respectively, if quarantine procedures
ere conducted in addition to market inspection.
. Discussion
RVF poses the biggest threat to the international trade
f Somali livestock (Abdo-Salem et al., 2011). As clinical
xamination is an ineffective way of detecting RVF in male
nimals, certiﬁcation based on regional/market inspections
oes little to control the export of infected animals. Labo-
atory testing, although more costly, is the only effective
eans of detecting infected males. RVF in Somali livestock
ould be better controlled through early detection with
ffective surveillance and outbreak control (Davies, 2006).
FMD  is widespread in Somalia, although there is huge
ariation in prevalence according to the serotype and
egion (Jabra, 2010). The role of live animal imports in the
pidemiology of FMD  in the Middle East has long been
ecognised (Hafez et al., 1994). FMD  is a major trade issue
n the region, with countries imposing consignment bans
ather than wholesale movement bans. As clinical exam
ill not detect all infected animals, particularly in shoats
nd East African cattle breeds in regions where FMD  is
ndemic, some infected animals are likely to make it into
he quarantine station causing occasional outbreaks. Under
IE standard export procedures this would lead to rejec-
ion of the whole batch. When measures are less rigorous
nd only diseased individuals or small groups are rejected,
ome infected animals are likely remain undetected. Most
ut not all infected animals would recover during the
uarantine period (in this example 21 days) and would
o longer be viraemic when exported. Quarantine peri-
ds of 7 days are sometimes used which does not allow
ime for animals to clear the virus and for outbreaks to
ie out (Ithondeka, 2010). The issue of within quarantine
ransmission highlights the importance of biosecurity andith no control)
quarantine batch rejection if risk is to be minimised; batch
rejection also compensates for low detection rates at the
individual animal level.
Yemen requires exported cattle to be vaccinated for
FMD  (Gazia, 2010). However, many animals may  become
infected by within quarantine transmission before the
onset of immunity after vaccination (outbreaks would peak
on day 3, whereas vaccine immunity would develop after at
least 4 days). Vaccination a week, or ideally a month, before
arrival at the quarantine would be hugely beneﬁcial pro-
vided that effective FMD  vaccines were used and could be
kept at a suitable temperature (2–8 ◦C). Although FMD  vac-
cination may  limit clinical signs in infected animals, making
them harder to detect, the reduction in virus shedding and
transmission due to vaccination is more important in this
context.
As an additional measure some countries test imported
animals for serological evidence of historic FMD  infection
after arrival at the destination port. The merits of this could
be questioned as Somalia and the importing countries have
equivalent FMD  status, however, serotype differences, only
detectable with more extensive testing, may  be important.
Clinical inspection appears to be effective for CCPP and
CBPP. Importantly both can spread through close contact;
they also have long incubation periods, meaning that new
infections will not be detected during quarantine. As a con-
sequence, market inspections with no quarantine results in
the lowest risk and is the most cost-effective strategy. As
quarantine may  result in an increased risk of infection at
export, the cost-effectiveness of this strategy is negative. A
similar situation exists for PPR. This is contrary to the logic
of standard pre-export quarantine where long quarantine
periods are used to allow development of clinical signs and
detection in those already infected.
One could argue that once the ﬁrst case in a batch
has been detected clinical examination will be performed
more thoroughly and with higher probability of detection,
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particularly when performed repeatedly during a period of
quarantine. Although this has not been considered explic-
itly in this study, variable probability of detection during
inspection is included. Furthermore this probability is
already quite high in the models used in this study (80–90%
for all diseases except FMD  which was 75–95%), leav-
ing limited scope for improved inspection. The problem
with clinical inspection is the proportion of subclinically
infected animals that cannot be detected no matter how
thorough the inspection is, especially with endemic dis-
eases and vaccinated populations. Detection of infections
that primarily cause clinical signs in pregnant females
poses a challenge as only males are exported (e.g. RVF and
Brucellosis).
For zoonotic pathogens such as Brucella spp. the oppor-
tunities for human infection from livestock exported
through ofﬁcial channels should be limited as they are not
intended for breeding, do not produce milk and often go
directly to slaughter. The most likely exposure is to peo-
ple involved in slaughter; however, it is of note that during
the Hajj millions of pilgrims are involved in the slaugh-
ter of 10–15 million sheep and goats in Mecca (Davies,
2006). Transmission of RVF in this situation is a possi-
bility and these risks may  be increased by local insect
vectors. Rapid slaughter of imported stock without con-
tacting native stock is crucial to prevent transmission from
infected imported animals to both humans and other ani-
mals.
The two main factors that determine the performance
of the different methods of export disease control are:
(1) Can the INFECTION be effectively detected by clinical
examination? and
(2) Will infection spread within the quarantine station?
Table 6 summarises which approach is optimal for con-
trolling the different diseases based on these factors. For
diseases with limited clinical signs regional market clinical
inspection alone is ineffective.
The assessed diseases can be split into three categories
based on characteristics of their risk of spread under quar-
antine conditions:(1) Those where little or no transmission will occur in the
quarantine (i.e. Brucellosis and RVF if vector transmis-
sion is controlled).
Table 6
Optimal livestock export control strategies (in italics) for different diseases categ
disease  and the risk of disease spread through transmission within a quarantine s
Negligible risk of spread at qu
Clinical diagnosis is partially effective
• Clinical diagnosis 
• Long quarantine 
•  (Laboratory test beneﬁcial)
Clinical diagnosis is not effective
• Laboratory test essential 
•  Clinical diagnosis 
• Long quarantine 
e.g. RVF, Brucellosis 
Abbreviations:  Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), Rift Valley fever (RVF), peste de
contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP).ary Medicine 113 (2014) 469–483
(2) Diseases where transmission can occur but recovery is
quick (i.e. FMD, assuming persistently infected/carrier
animals do not spread infection).
(3) Diseases where transmission can occur but recovery is
not quick (i.e. PPR, CCPP and CBPP).
The results indicate that for category (1), quarantine
reduces the risk. For category (2) a long period of quar-
antine would on the whole reduce the risk of infection
(as any new infections have time to recover) but on occa-
sion the risk may  increase during quarantine, due to the
unpredictable nature of these fast spreading pathogens.
Even quarantine length is sufﬁcient to allow recovery from
viraemia, the percentage of animals that sero-convert will
increase with quarantine duration and some countries
reject animals based on serology. For category (3) the risk
increases with increasing length of quarantine. Quarantine
transmission can be reduced by using laboratory testing
and vaccination of animals before admission to the quar-
antine.
In reality only one certiﬁcation protocol can be applied
per importing country. A possible way of selecting the most
suitable export protocol would be to ﬁrst prioritise the dis-
eases based on the probability of importing infected Somali
stock with no control measures and the consequences of
pathogen incursion. Secondly, look at which protocols are
effective at controlling the priority pathogens and thirdly
consider cost-effectiveness if two protocols are similarly
effective. Finally, the effect of the selected protocol on the
control of lesser priority pathogens should be considered.
Zoonoses like RVF and Brucellosis typically cause con-
siderable public concern. Looking at the non-zoonotic
diseases considered, both PPR and FMD  are endemic in
the Middle East. However, unlike PPR, FMD  has several
serotypes, some exotic to the Middle East with the poten-
tial to cause heavy losses. CCPP and CBPP are both already
endemic in the Middle East.
If the control of Brucella spp., RVF and FMD  virus are
prioritised then quarantine measures are required with
laboratory diagnostics. Although market inspection is rel-
atively cheap it is not an effective method of controlling
these three pathogens. In the long term, if more con-
trol measures could be performed at regional markets,
including diagnostics and vaccination before arrival at
quarantine, it would reduce infection risk at point of export.
orised on both the effectiveness of clinical examination at detecting the
tation.
arantine High risk of spread at quarantine
• Clinical diagnosis
• Short quarantine
• (Laboratory test beneﬁcial)
e.g. CCPP, CBPP and PPR
• Laboratory test essential
• Clinical diagnosis
• Short quarantine
e.g. FMD  (arguably long quarantine if rapid recovery)
s petits ruminants (PPR), contagious caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP),
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Improved disease control at regional markets would
lso beneﬁt livestock health status throughout the coun-
ry. If diseased stock can be detected at regional markets
efore they are transported across Somalia, then within
ountry spread of disease will be reduced and with fewer
nfected animals entering the port, quarantine will be more
ffective.
Diseased consignments detected and rejected upon
rrival at the destination port never return to Somalia
ut are shipped elsewhere in the region (Addis workshop,
010). This highlights the importance of disease detection
s far up the market chain as possible to minimise spread.
If a long quarantine compromises control of certain
athogens (e.g. PPR, CCPP and CBPP) the quarantine proto-
ols should be amended to maintain control throughout the
uarantine period. This could be evaluated through audit-
ng and inspection, as well as diagnostic testing of imported
omali stock.
Some form of holding station has to exist to export
nimals in such large numbers. If quarantines were not
sed the alternative would be holding stations with mini-
al  biosecurity and greater potential for spreading disease.
n addition, it may  not be possible to conduct inspection
nd certiﬁcation to a consistent standard at regional mar-
ets throughout Somalia, thus a ﬁnal evaluation of disease
tatus is required before export. Therefore the use of quar-
ntine at point of export is advocated despite its high
ost.
Besides the measures investigated, discussions with
omali stakeholders indicated that animals are checked
nd screened at markets in order to select animals of export
uality that are ﬁt to travel. These practices are well known
mongst the Somalis, but not documented and therefore
ot well understood by the importing countries. It is sug-
ested that future local market level initiatives need to
able A.1
nput parameters for the risk assessment on Brucella sp. in exported Somali shoat
Parameter (symbol) Input So
Proportion of Somali shoats that are
infected (uc)
Uniform(0.02,0.15) M
(2
Relative risk in males versus females
(rr)
Expected value = 0.81 (D
W
re
di
 =
Proportion of males in populations
used to estimate uc (pm)
Uniform(0.15,0.21) Fa
Proportion of males infected (mi) Expected value = 0.07 uc
Proportion of infected males with
clinical signs (cs)
Uniform(0,0.1) Ad
Proportion of animals with clinical
signs not detected at inspection (mc)
1 − Uniform(0.8,0.9) Ad
Proportion of infected that are not
detected at clinical exam (me)
Expected value = 0.96 (1
Proportion that are not detected by
laboratory test, rose-bengal plate
test (mll)
1 − Normal(0.812,0.248). Ga
Proportion that are not detected
during the quarantine period (mq)
Expected value = 0.95 (1ary Medicine 113 (2014) 469–483 479
build on these local systems to collect data on the ﬂows of
animals, including the ones rejected and to perform sam-
pling and vaccination.
When exporting many millions of animals from
endemic populations in a poor country it may  be unre-
alistic to expect them to be free from infection. In order
to protect the Somali livestock export trade from further
bans the number of infected, exported animals should be
minimised by applying many different measures in com-
bination. As the protocol that achieves maximal control
for one disease may  compromise the control of other dis-
eases, prioritisation of pathogens is required to identify the
preferred strategy.
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Appendix A.
s.
urce Assumptions
cDermott and Arimi
002)
Prevalence is similar to neighbouring
countries as Somali surveillance data
not available. Sero-positivity reﬂects
active infection
inka and Chala, 2009)
here the natural log
lative risk is normally
stributed ( = −0.21,
 0.18).
Based on data from cattle in Ethiopia.
Truncated to avoid relative risks below
zero
rm AFRICA (1996) Based on data from neighbouring
countries
 * rr/(1 − pm) + (pm × rr)
dis workshop (2010) Infected males show few clinical signs
dis workshop (2010)
 − cs)  + (cs × mc)
ll and Nielsen (2004) 1 − test sensitivity. All animals are
tested. Truncated to avoid sensitivities
below zero
 − cs)  + (cs × mc21) If quarantine is 21 days and
inspections conducted daily
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Table  A.2
Input parameters for the risk assessment on foot-and-mouth disease in exported Somali shoats.
Parameter (symbol) Input Source Assumptions
Proportion of shoats infected (mi) 0.01 (assumed design
prevalence)
Cattle seroprevalence varies
between 0% and 91.1%,
depending on region and
serotype (Jabra, 2010)
Seropositivity does not imply infection,
so an assumed design prevalence of
0.01 (1%) was used to assess control
measures
Time  to appearance of clinical signs,
days (ip)
Uniform(3,8) Kitching and Hughes (2002) Assumes values for Somali shoats are
the same as non-pastoral FMD naïve
sheep breeds
Number of days of viral shedding
before clinical signs appear (s)
Uniform(1,2) Sellers and Parker (1969)
Start of viral shedding, days (ss) Expected value = 4 ip − s
Duration of viral shedding, days (ds) Uniform(1,5) Kitching and Hughes (2002)
Proportion of infections that never
show clinical signs (sc)
0.45 Kitching and Hughes (2002) 25% no signs and 20% single mouth
lesions. In endemic populations fewer
may  show clinical signs
Proportion of the animals that develop
clinical signs that are clinically
affected on day of examination (dc)
Expected value = 0.2 (ds − s)/(ss + ds)  Based on the fraction of the time an
animal is infected that the animal has
clinical signs
Proportion of clinically detectable
animals that are missed (mc)
1 − Uniform(0.75,0.95) Addis workshop (2010) Animals require full oral exam to
reduce this (this is not performed)
Proportion of infected that are not
detected at clinical exam (me)
Expected value = 0.9 ((1 − sc) × dc × mc) + ((1 − sc)  × (1 − dc)) + sc
Proportion missed after lab test (mll) 1 (no sheep tested) Gazia (2010) No FMD  laboratory testing is used for
sheep
Length  of quarantine (nq) 21 days Recommended period
(Thomson et al., 2009)
This in fact varies according to
destination
Proportion immune in the population
at large (Rt=0)
Uniform(0,0.911) Jabra (2010) Seropositivity implies immunity.
Seroprevalence in cattle used to
represent shoats
Table A.3
Input parameters for the risk assessment on foot-and-mouth disease in exported Somali cattle.
Parameter (symbol) Input Source Assumptions
Proportion of cattle infected (mi) 0.01 Seroprevalence varies
between 0% and 91.1%,
depending on region and
serotype (Jabra, 2010)
Seropositivity does not imply
infection, so an assumed value
of 0.01 (1%) was used to assess
control measures
Appearance of clinical signs, days (ip) Betapert(2,6,14) Alexandersen et al. (2003b)
Start of viral shedding, days (ss) Ip Alexandersen et al. (2003b)
Duration of viral shedding, days (ds) Unform(4,5) Alexandersen et al. (2003b)
Proportion of infections that are
subclinical (sc)
Triang(0.003,0.003,0.59183) Hutber et al. (1999), Kitching
(2002), and Alexandersen
et al. (2003a)
Distribution Fitted from data in
Hutber et al. (1999)
Proportion of animals that develop
clinical signs that are clinically
affected on day on examination (dc)
Expected value = 0.4 ds/(ss + ds)  Based on the fraction of the
time an animal is infected that
the animal has clinical signs
Proportion of clinically detectable
animals that are missed (mc)
1 − Uniform(0.75,0.95) Addis workshop (2010)
Proportion of infected that are not
detected at clinical exam (me)
Expected value = 93% ((1 − sc) × dc × mc) + ((1 − sc)  × (1 − dc)) + sc
Proportion receiving a laboratory test
(pl)
1 ∼ all tested Gazia (2010) Assumed all tested for
antibodies by ELISA
Proportion of tested, infected animals
not detected by laboratory test (ml)
1 − Uniform(0.9,0.95) Moonen et al. (2004) and
Niedbalski (2004)
1 − test sensitivity
Proportion missed after lab test (mll) Expected value = 0.075 (pl × ml) + (1 − pl)
Proportion vaccinated (vc) 1 Gazia (2010) All vaccinated – vaccine takes
effect at day 4 of quarantine
Onset  of vaccine immunity Uniform(4,9) Cox and Barnett (2009) Immunity develops 4 to 9 days
after vaccination
Vaccine efﬁcacy (ve) Uniform(0.5, 0.8) Addis workshop (2010),
Backer et al. (2009), and Cox
and Barnett (2009)
Concerns protection against
infection
Length  of quarantine 21 days Recommended period
(Thomson et al., 2009)
This in fact varies according to
destination
Proportion immune in the population
at large (Rt=0)
Uniform(0,0.911) Jabra (2010) Seropositivity implies
immunity
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Table  A.4
Input parameters for the risk assessment on Rift Valley fever in exported Somali livestock.
Parameter (symbol) Input Source Assumptions
Proportion of Somali shoats that are
infected (mi)
0.01 Assumed design
prevalence
RVF is believed to be endemic
in Somalia but prevalence
varies (Soumare et al., 2007)
Proportion of infected animals with
clinical signs (cs)
0 Acha and Szyfres (2001),
EFSA (2005), and Davies
(2006)
Exported animals are males,
which do not show clinical
signs
Proportion of infected that are not
detected at clinical exam (me)
1 1 − cs
Proportion tested with ELISA antibody
test at quarantine (pl)
Discrete({0,0.05,1},{1,1,1}) Gazia (2010) Either 0%, 5% or 100% of
animals are tested
Proportion of infected and tested that
are not detected by laboratory test
(ml)
1 − (RiskUniform(0.99,1)) Paweska et al. (2003) and
Paweska et al. (2005)
1 − test sensitivity
Proportion missed after lab test (mll) Expected value = 0.65 (pl × ml)  + (1 − pl)
Proportion that are not detected
during the quarantine period (mq)
Expected value = 1 Exported animals are males,
which do not show clinical
signs
Table A.5
Input parameters for the risk assessment on peste des petits ruminants in exported Somali shoats.
Parameter (symbol) Input Source Assumptions
Proportion of Somali shoats that are
infected (mi)
0.01 Assumed design prevalence
Proportion of infected animals with
clinical signs (cs)
Uniform(0,1) This varies greatly, sheep may
be asymptomatic (Kulkarni
et al., 1996; OIE, 2009b)
Proportion of clinical cases not
detected at clinical exam (mc)
1 − Uniform(0.8,0.9) Addis workshop (2010)
Proportion of infected that are not
detected at clinical exam (me)
Expected value = 0.575 (cs × mc) + (1 − cs)
Proportion tested with ELISA antibody
test at quarantine (pl)
Discrete({0,0.05,1},{1,1,1}) Gazia (2010) Either 0%, 5% or 100% of
animals are tested
Proportion of infected that are not
detected by laboratory test (ml)
1–0.922 Singh et al. (2004) No uncertainty incorporated
Proportion missed after lab test (mll) Expected = 0.95 (pl × ml) + (1 − pl)
Proportion of uninfected that are
immune (pi)
1–0.29 Medina (2007b) Based on 29% seroprevalence
in Somalia
Proportion of naïve that become
infected during the quarantine (qi)
Uniform(0.1,0.9) Up to 90% morbidity reported
(OIE, 2009b)
Proportion of animals not infected at
quarantine entry that become
infected during the quarantine (qii)
pi × qi
Proportion of infections not detected
during the quarantine period (mq)
Expected value = 0.575 As for me Simpliﬁcation as infections are
acquired throughout the
quarantine
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Table  A.6
Input parameters for the risk assessment on contagious caprine pleuropneumonia in exported Somali shoats.
Parameter (symbol) Input Source Assumptions
Proportion of Somali shoats that are
infected (mi)
0.0169 Medina (2007a) This is based on an apparent
seroprevalence of 1.3% adjusted for
false negatives
Proportion of infected animals with
clinical signs (cs)
Uniform(0.8,1) Up to 100% morbidity in
goats (Rurangirwa et al.,
1981; OIE, 2009a)
Proportion of clinical cases not
detected at clinical exam (mc)
1 − Uniform(0.8,0.9) Addis workshop (2010)
Proportion of infected that are not
detected at clinical exam (me)
Expected value = 0.235 (cs × mc) + (1 − cs)
Proportion tested with ELISA antibody
test at quarantine (pl)
0% and 100% tested
assessed
Gazia (2010) Laboratory test not routinely
performed but assessed here for
interest
Proportion of infected that are not
detected by laboratory test (ml)
1 − Uniform(0.64,0.7) Bellini et al. (1998) and
Medina (2007a)
1 − test sensitivity
Proportion missed after lab test (mll) (pl × ml)  + (1 − pl)
Proportion of infections not detected
during the quarantine period (mq)
Expected value = 0.1 (1 − cs) + (cs × mc21) If quarantine is 21 days and
inspections conducted daily. New
infections acquired during the
quarantine could not be detected due
to the long incubation period
Table A.7
Input parameters for the risk assessment on contagious bovine pleuropneumonia in exported Somali cattle.
Parameter (symbol) Input Source Assumptions
Proportion of Somali cattle that are
infected (mi)
0.0338 Somali Animal Health
Services Project (2008)
This is based on an apparent
seroprevalence of 2.6% adjusted for
false negatives
Proportion of infected animals with
clinical signs (cs)
0.8 EU (2001) No variation incorporated
Proportion of clinical cases not
detected at clinical exam (mc)
1 − Uniform(0.8,0.9) Addis workshop (2010)
Proportion of infected that are not
detected at clinical exam (me)
Expected value = 0.32 (cs × mc) + (1 − cs)
Proportion tested with ELISA antibody
test at quarantine (pl)
0% and 100% tested
assessed
Gazia (2010) Laboratory test not routinely
performed but assessed here for
interest
Proportion of infected that are not
detected by laboratory test (ml)
1 − Uniform(0.64,0.7) Bellini et al. (1998) and
Medina (2007a)
1 − test sensitivity
Proportion missed after lab test (mll) (pl × ml) + (1 − pl)
Proportion of infections not detected
during the quarantine period (mq)
Expected value = 0.2 (1 − cs)  + (cs × mc21) If quarantine is 21 days and
inspections conducted daily. NewReferences
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